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B R I T I S H  A G E N T S  
IN 
AFGHANISTAN. 
IN a letter addressed to the '' Times," on the 23rd of 
November last, the Duke of Argyll made the following 
statement :- 
;' " General assurances mere given to Shere AX (in 
1869) that from time to time we should give him 
such assi~~taace and support as the circumstances of 
the case might seem, in our judgment, to justlfy and 
require. 
" It may well be asked if this was enough to satisfy 
the Ameey as a substitute for all the demands he had 
made-for the treaty offensive and defensive, for the 
gr~arantee against domestic enemies, for the assurance 
of his succession, f o r  the annual subsidy? No. There 
was one more concession which Lord Mayo made, and 
made willingly. He promised to the Ameer ' that no 
European officers would be placed as Residents in hie 
cities.' ' 
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the Dttke of Argyll bears testimony* to the fact that, 
in the early part of 1869, on first assuming the Trice- 
royalty, Lord Mayo, on his part, recog~iserl~ the 
utilif!/ of having a11 European official at Cnbul, hut  
considered t1hat the British Gorennnent could, " n.it11- 
ootI sencling, nt p/*esast, ally European official to Cabul, 
exercise sufficient influence over him (Shere dli) to 
keep him oil the most anlicnble terms wit11 us."? His 
Grace also shoxs, correctly enough, t'hat Lord ~ I ~ I . ? J - o  
was a t  that time opposed to our taking "any clirect 
part in the internal affairs of Afghanistan;" and that 
he did not tWei2, maut any " Resident at  Cablll, or 
political influence in his (Shere Ali's) kingdom," 
although lie fully appreciated the mlne of " obtaining 
accurate infor~nation as to  the events that occur in 
Ccntrnl Asia." 
In  deducing from these facts tllnt Lord filaj-o recog- 
nised that 'cO1le of the g ~ e a t  :a~l~-antagcs to be cLerired 
fro111 t?le approaching conferellce aoulcl be the oppor- 
tI~ll1ity it  v-ould afford him of satisfj%lg the ihleer 
that we did not ~5-ant to press any Residents upon 
him," $ the Duke of Argyll falls into error. Equally 
so xheu he states, vith emplmsis, that tlicrc waa 
"one more concession ~ l l i c l l  LORI ;\layo ~u:~dc, 
and made ~~illingly-he p~olliised to the A~neer ' that 
no European officers shonlcl be placed as Residnita 
in his cities.' " 
* c c  The Eastern Question," rol. ii. p. 253. 
t Ibid., vol. ii. pp. 556, 257. 
j: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 264. 
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informed of all affairs," and to match the disbursement 
of the subsidy; they were not to interfere in any may 
'' in the internal administration of the country." 
In  the various conferences between the Punjab and 
Afghan authorities, in connection with this agree- 
ment, it became apparent that the presence of British 
officers in afghanistan was not so unpalatable to the - -  - U 
afghans as had been anticipated, although aan influential 
party, including Dosb Mahomed himself, had so strong 
an obiection to their location at the capital itself that 
.I 
the clause of the agreement, so far as it affected 
Cabul, remained a dead letter. 
The follonkg passages from some portions of the 
correspondence of that period -ivill sl~ow the general 
feeling of the Afghans of 185'7 on this subject. 
'On the 7th of January, 185'7, Mr. Lawrence ad- 
dressed Lord Canning's Government as follows :-* 
c c  Hafizjeet on this asked whether it mas our purpose 
to send British officers to Afghanistan. It was stated 
that, provided Government consented to assist the 
Ameer, it mould be a condition that such officers 
should be deputed, and receive the countenance and 
* 
support of His Highness. But that they would 
exercise no authority nor any command. Their duty 
- - -  
would be to attend the Ameer, or any of his sons 
* No. 23A., 7 January 1847, p. 68. Epitome of Cabul Corre- 
spondence, published in Lahore Government Press. 1863. 
t t'Hafizjee, son of the Mir Wais, one of the most influential 
men in the kingdom, whose sanctity is so great and popular (fronl 
uniting the Sayyad and Sunni in one) that it is supposed his dis- 
ciples in Cabul and the Kohistan could give away the throne." 
(Colonel Edwardes, p. 53, Bid.) 
he might entrust with the charge of distinct 
portion of the Afghan force, and to give advice when 
required, and to obtain all the information which our 
Governmellt might require, for which the Ameer would 
be bonnd to afford every facility. It was distinctly 
explained that they would neither interfere in the 
administration, nor instruct nor pay the troops. To 
this the Ameer and Sirdars expressed their assent, and, - 
indeed, appeared as if they perceived the reasonable- 
ness of the arrangement. It was a point on which 
some difficulty had been anticipated ; but the readiness 
with mliich i t  mas agreed to was remarkable." 
He again mo te  on the 15th of January, 1857 :-* 
" It may be expedient here to  observe that so far 
from the Afghan Chiefs raising objection, or in any 
way indicating an ~mwillingness t o  see British officers 
in Cabul, they had actually shown by their remarks 
that they mere prepazed to allow our officers to inter- 
fere in s manner much more decided than was con- 
templated. Thus, while the Chief Commissioner was 
explaining to the Chiefs the particular duties which 
Government required of our officers, Hafizjee inter- 
rupted his remarks by saying, ' they ' (the officers) 
' can give the Ameer advice, they can instruct and 
drill the troops.' 'I'here can be no doubt, therefore, 
that the and his Sirdars were quite prepared 
for the presence of our officers, in the event of any 
subsidy being allowed; at the same time, it is now 
@qualb clear that such an arrangement is distasteful 
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the Chicf Commissioner recapitulated those points of 
the arrangement which appeared most importnut, or 
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These records bear testimony, of themselves, to the 
general accuracy of the following Note* recorded by  
m~self  in 1877 :- 
c C  I can fully corroborate all that Captain Grey and 
Dr. Bellen say as to the willingness of the Arneer at 
Umballa to considel* the subject of British Agencies in 
Afghanistan had he received encouragement t o  enter 
officially into the subject, and had his expectations of 
being granted a new treaty been responded to. The 
same evidence which certified to Shere Mi's desire fo r  
a treaty certified to his willingness to receive British 
Agents. If the one was imaginary, SO was the other. 
Being at that time in Lord Mayo's full confidence, I 
can testify to the fact that both he himself and those 
associated with him accepted the evidence of the 
Arneer's wishes in both cases as genuine. The time 
had, howe~er, not arrived for the consideration of 
either question ; and the orders of Her Majesty's 
Government, added to Lord Mayo's own personal 
views as to  the requirement of the moment, and the 
danger of suddenly deviating from the policy of the 
Viceroy who had just left India, induced him to dis- 
courage the o6cial mention of either matter at the 
conferences. Moreover, His Highness made no formal 
proposition on the subject, hoping, as we were led t o  
believe, that it might come first from the Viceroy, and 
thereby ensure him better terms." 
But, although, as Private Secretary to the Viceroy 
in 1869, I was in Lord Mayo's " full confidence," 
I 
+ Colonel Burne's Note; p. 1741, afghanistan, No. 1. 
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I do not desire to place my own recollections or 
memoranda in too great prominence. I am con- 
tent to substantiate my statement above quoted by 
means of docnments which were received and recorded, 
at the time, in the official archives of the Indian 
Foreign Office, copies of which documents have been, 
since the Umballa durbar,* in my possession. 
I beg, in the first instance, to refer to a record of a 
Council held by the AmeeT at  Lahore on the 16th 
March, 1869, whilst en. ~ o u t e  to Umballa. 
This record was furnished by X. 'Y., a fa i thf~~l  ser- 
vant who possessed, and still possesses, the confidence 
of the Government of India, and whose accuracy in 
similar cases has borne the test of years and has not 
I 
been found wanting. - 
At this Council the following conversations be- 
? tween Shere Ali and his confidential advisers took 
place :- 
" The Ameer then said,-' S h o ~ ~ l d  the British autho- 
rities propose that a European Agent be stationed at 
Oabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such 
arrangement, but the people of Oabul are turbulent 
and mischievous-should such European Agent be in- 
jured in any way, which God forbid, I would be dis- 
graced. The late Ameer, my father, on these very 
considerations, refused to have a European Agent at 
his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, 
at  places like Candahar, or Balkh, or Herat, there 
* They have also been published, in whole or in part, in recent 
Blue Books. 
would be no objection. Such an arrangement would 
be advantageous to both Governments ; for bstance, 
at the present time the people of the Lower Seistan 1 
have commenced. encroachments on the Candahar 
boundaries. Lower Seistan was formerly always at- 
tached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by 1 
Persia only since a short time. We are not aware 
mhat agreement exists between the British and Per- 
sian Governments regarding Lower Seistan. If there 
should be a European Agent on the border, he would 
be possessed of the necessary information, and would 
be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to 
territories beyond the borders .' " 
" ALl the members approved of what the Ameer h a d  
said," 
I beg, in the second place, to refer to a Note  
written, at the time, by the Under Secretary in the 
Foreign Department of the Government of India. This 
Note is dated 26th March, 1869, and was received a n d  
officially recorded as a genuine document. It ran as 
follows :- 
" The Viceroy may possibly desire to have without 
delay the following details which I have learnt f rom 
Punjab officials in the course of conversation yesterday 
and to-day. The Ameer is prepared, if asked, to allow 
European Agents at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh, 
but he would raise difficulties, though probably not I I 
I 
insuperable ones, about such an officer at  Cabul." I 
I beg, in the third place, to refer to a conversation 
between Major Grey and Shere Ali, in which allusion 
was made by the b e e r  to the same subject. 
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The record of this conversation was equally received 
and recorded at the time as genuine. Before quoting 
it, however, it may be expedient to describe the exact 
position hold by Major Grey at the Umballa confe- 
rence, and the opinion which Lord Mayo held of that 
officer. I feel bound, in justice to Captain Grey, to 
take this course, as some unmerited doubts have been 
cast on his position a t  Umballa, and the accuracy of 
his statements made then and since. 
Major 'Grey is an officer of recognised experience 
and ability. For his general intelligence and complete 
knowledge of Persian, Lord Mayo selected him as 
special interpreter at Umballa between His Excellency 
and Shere Ali. Of Lord Mayo's personal opinion of 
him I need only quote the following statement* from 
many others of a similar kind :- 
" Captain Grey, who knows them (the Afghans) 
all thoroughly, and is steady and wise, and entirely in 
our confidence (as he was interpreter at Umballa) 
keeps up a purely unofficial correspondence with Nur 
Mahomed, the Minister. This is useful." 
No one in 1869 ventured to call in question this 
officer's veracity; and in that year the following 
statement, signed and verified by the Foreign Secre- 
tary, was handed in to the Viceroy, was accepted as 
genuine, and was recorded in the archives of the 
Foreign Office. It is dated 31st March 1869, and 
runs as follows :- 
" The Ameer is prepared to act on what he may see 
* Lord Mayo, 17 October 1869. 
is the nature of the friendship the British pr3pose to 
afford him. If, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the 
ruler of Cabul de fncto, well and good, but if prepared 
to acknowledge and support him and the heir he may 
point out (the contrary having produced the present 
troubles), tlhere is nothing he will not accede to. 
" He is open to any proposition for securing his 
northern border. While doubtful of any Russian power 
for aggression for some years to come, still he thinks 
precautions should he taken ; he mould collstruct forts 
on his own part, or under our superintendence, and 
admit European garrisons if ever desired; he would 
gladly see an Agent or engineer superintendent in 
Balkh, Herat, or anymhere but actually in Cabul, 
which might lead tc tjhe supposition of hs being a 
puppet ." 
But there is yet another officer's evidence in favour 
of this view-an officer who was attached to the 
Ameer's personal staff as his int'erpreter ; an officer 
who mas a personal friend of Shere Ali's, who was 
on the most intimate terms with him, who had a 
thorough knowledge of the Pushtoo language, and 
could hardly retain a wrong impression of his many 
conversations with His Highness. This officer, Dr. 
Bellevr, mtting in 1875, says that the impression left 
on his mind at Umballa was that " Shere Ali would 
gladly see Agents at Herat and Candahar."* 
I have, however, no wish t o  rely solely on the f 
evidenoe thus given ; I therefore may be permitted t o  
* gee p. 273, Afghanistan, No: 1. 
quote Lord Mayo's own words, when he wrote* to  
Sir Henry Rawliuson after the Umballa durbar, 
treating the question of an Agency at Herat as a new 
one which did not take a prominent place at the Um- 
balla confe&nce ; testifying, at the same time, to Shere 
Ali's willingness, although evincing, in his opinion, 
no positive anxiety, to receive British Agencies a t  
Herat, Candahar, or Balkh, if desired. 
Lord Mayo writes :- 
c c  It was repeatedly explained to him (Shere Ali) 
that we should never send a British soldier to assist 
him against his rebellious subjects. . . . . I own I 
am very sceptical as to the prop14iet-y of placing a 
British Resident at Herat, but I mill reserve my 
opinion until I hear the reasons. As a r~ile, I am 
totally opposed to sending Emopean Politicals to any 
Asiatic town if it can be avoided ; they are a dangerous 
class, and many a misfortune can be traced to their 
honest but misplaced activity. I do not believe, from 
what the Ameer said at Umballa, that he would offer 
any opposition to an English Agent being placed a t  
Candahar, Herat, or Balkh, though he mo111d strongly 
object to the appearance of one at CaBul. But I do 
not think he wished for it allywhere, fearing the effect 
it might have on his own subjects." 
When, in 1875, the question of an Agency a t  Herat 
unexpectedly caused a difference of opinion between 
Her Majesty's Home Government and that of India, 
Ldrd Northbrook's Government endeavoured to shake 
* Lord Mayo t o  Sir Henry Rawfinson, 10 June 1869. 
the evidence given and accepted as genuine in 1869. 
But it failed to do so to any material extent. Major 
Grey's evidence, indeed, became more emphatic than 
that given in 1869 ; for he says,' " the Ameer did freely 
consent to the appointment of British officeis in Balkh, 
Herat, or anywhere but actually at Cabul;" and the 
Government of India could not but acknowledge that 
Captain Grey's evidence was not to be ignored. For, 
in addressing the Secretary of State for Indiat in 
that year, they said :- 
"On the whole, however, we think that either 
the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahorned 
Shah, did, in confidential communication with Captain 
Grey, express a readiness to accept at some future 
time, not far distant, the presence of British Agents 
in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself." 
Passing from this correspondence, we come to evi- 
dence of a more date, on which the Duke of 
Argyll places much reliance-that of Mr. Seton Karr, 
who, in 1869, filled the position of Foreign Secretary to 
the Government of India. Mr. Seton Karr's evidence 
is culled from his private memorandum book. That 
evidence is not on official record, either in India, or at 
the India Office ; and I give prominence to this fact 
as showing the secondary importance to be attached 
to it. It is an axiom of Indian administration to 
record every word, every h e ,  every expression of im- 
portance, which passes between a Viceroy and an Asiatic 
* See p. 144, Bfghanistan, No. 1. 
t To Secretary of State, 7 June 1875, p. 129, Afghanistan, No. 1. 
potentate, or a Foreign Secretary and an Asiatic ;J 
minister. This is a point on which most scrupulou~ ij h 
care is taken. It is necessary to existing, and vital I +  4 
to future, interests; and, such being the case, no ,: 1 0  
responsible Government can justifiably accept extracts 1 2  
d from private memoranda given ten yeam after an 
event, unless fully supported by the official records l 
of the date to which those memoranda may refer. 
Mr. Seton Ear r  is a distinguished Indian servant, 
whose veracity, honour, and ability, are not to be im- 
peached. But to what, after all, does his testimony 
amount ? Why, merely30 substantiate that of Captain 
Grey, vie. that the Ameer did not want a Resident 
a t  Cahul, and to a complete negation of the solemn 
guarantee on which the Dake of Argyll relies. I 
give his own words. 
' ( I  .) Mr. Seton Earr's letter to Lord Lawrence, 
dated 18th November, 1878. 
This is what he says to Lord Lawrence :- 
" As instructed by Lord Mayo, I did broach (to the 
Ameer) the subject of an English Resident at Chbul. 
Both he and his Minister clearly intimated that they 
could not accede to this step. It would be viewed 
with suspicion, they said, by a strong party at Cabul. 
It would excite prejudice and hostility; if anything 
happened to the Resident, the Ameer would be blamed ; 
and many similar arguments. He certainly did add 
that, perso~~ally, he might have no strong objectio~zs to  
a Resident, but urged that his chiefs and nobles would 
resent the presencq of an Englishman, and that he 
that this latter expression I was merely meant to soften 
down his refusal." Indeed, from the Ameer's manner, as 
well as from that of his Minister, I judged that he dis- 
liked this idea as much as anyone, and had no wish for 
any English political officer. The subject was not again 
p~ressed, and Lord Mayo never, I think, apprehended 
that the proposal would find acceptance. ' My commu- 
nications with the Ameer and with Nur Mahommed 
were long and frequent." I noted down these results 
at the time. I have frequently thought over the 
matter since, and I am quite certain of my facts." 
. (2.) Mr. Seton Kayr's letter to the Under Secretary 
of State for India, dated 10th December, 18'78 :- 
'< I repeat that I was distinctly empowered by Lord 
Mayo to ask the Ameer whether he would consent to 
an English Resident (at Cabul), and his reply was that 9 
though personally he might not object, it ' would do 
him harm in the eyes of his people,' and he and his 
Ministers used other arguments to the safme effect. 
This was by me reported to Lord Mayo in the presence 
* I n  a letter addressed to  me on the 4th of April 1869, Mr. 
Seton Karr, referring to his conversations with Nur Mahomed, 
wrote- 
" I could not find an opportunity last night to tell His Excel- 
lency that the Ameer, through his Minister, clearly understands 
v 
the wishes of the Government about trade and the passes," &c. 
In  a Note of the same date, enclosed to me for Lord Mayo's 
information, Captain Grey made a further report of his private 
conversations with the b e e r  on matters which Lord Mayo 
desired him (Captain Grey) to discuss with His Highness, in the 
course of which Shere Ali " expressed his readiness to meet the ! 
British Government half -way in every matter that interested 
them." 
( 19 ) 
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312 of Lord Sandhurst, and the subject was at once dropped 
5s by the Viceroy's express desire." 
s- The Duke of Argyll, in a letter to Mr. Seton Karr, 
>* dated the 14th December (published in the c c  Daily 
News " of the 18th idem), congratulates him on having 
d spoken the truth; believing, apparently, tliat his 
L-  evidence had disproved the statement that the Ameer 
d was not unwilling in 1869 to receive European Agents 
is in his country (except at Cabul), and that Mr. Seton 
e Karr had given a denial to this assertion. 
But all Mr. Seton Ram apparently adduces from 
Y his private memoranda, is the fact stated by Major 
Grey and others in 1869, that the Ameer would 
3 
" raise difficulties, although probably not insuper- 
able ones," to the location of a Resident at Cabul. 
Mr. Seton Karr-no doubt inadvertently-omitted 
3 to state that the evidence tendered and accepted 
3 as genuine at Umballa showed that Shere Ali was not 
unwilling to have considered the question of the 
3 location of British officers elsewhere than at the 
capital, had he been asked, or had the matter been 
looked upon as of sufficient importance (which it was 
not) to have been urged upon him by the Viceroy. 
That Lord Mayo did not really desire, in 1869, to 
send British officers to Cabul, or to any othey part of 
Afghanistan, as permanent Agents, or, in other words, 
to exercise, in, the state of things then existing, inter- 
ference in the " internal affairs of the country," is 
evident from his published despatches and from his 
letters quoted by the Duke of Argyll. But before 
each of his conferences with Shere Ali, he went over 
2 *  
with Major Grey, in my presence, the ground whicb 
he intended to take up in the event of the Ameer 
bringing the subject f ormard ; and his whole object 
was,. whilst making up his mind to refuse to allow 
officers to go then to Afghanistan, yet to leave his 
hands entirely free as to sending them at any futura 
time. I am sure Major Grey will bear me out in this 
statement; it may also be in his recollection that the 
Ameer took a sudden whim into his head as to taking 
his friend Colonel Chxrles Chamberlain back with him to 
Cabul-a step to which Lord Mayo declined to accede. 
Whilst the Ameer was not unwilling, the Viceroy 
was not willing, to  see British officers in Afghanistan. 
Lord Mayo only wished to establish what he called an 
" intermediate " policy. He had no wish to interfere, 
nor was there at that  time any object in doing so, mith 
the internal politics of the country or with the family 
quarrels of the Barakzaies; consequently at  his per- 
sonal conferences with Shere Bli, he gave him no 
encouragement to bring forward the question of 
Agents, or other measures involving responsibility in 
the internal affairs of Afghanistan. 
Lord Mayo's own views in this respect are contained 
in his private correspondence with the Duke of Argyll 
and others. 
Thus, he wrote, on the 2nd March 1869,- 
"I am entirely opposed to any attempt to take any 
direct part in the internal affairs of Afghanistan." 
On the 3rd of June 1869 he wrote,- 
"As the invasioll by a foreign Europeall Power of 
his territory was never alluded to by the Ameer or me, 
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our course of action, in the event of such an occur- 
rence taking place, is not affected by anything that 
took place at Umballa." 
Re  again wrote, on the 10th June 1869,- 
" It was repeatedly explained to him (Shere Ali) 
that we should never send a British soldier to assist 
him against his rebellious subjects." 
And again, on the 2nd July 1871,- 
" Then (if Afghanistan were threatened from with- 
out) it might be indispensable to the safety of India 
that we should support the Ruler of Cabul with men, 
money, and arms ; but the Ameer was told at Umballa 
that no British officer or soldier would ever cross his 
frontier to he@ him to put down a rebellion. Afghans 
do not fight when they can murder or bribe. As our 
officers do not indulge in the latter business, they 
would probably, if employed in Afghanistan, be dis- 
posed of by assassination, in which case, I think, the. 
British lion would naturally seek revenge. I think 
we should wait a long time before we encouraged civil 
war in Afghanistan by giving either oficers o r  money 
to  assist any BaraTcsai in conquering another." 
Again, in regard to the general line of policy to be 
pursued in future contingencies towards Afghanistan 
and other neigh bouring States, he wrote :-* 
" I have never met a sensible politician who held 
the opinion that our true policy is to await an inva- 
sion of India within our frontiers. I have frequently 
laid down what I believe t o  be the cardinal points of 
* Memorandum, 29 December 1871. 
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Anglo-Indian policy. They may be summed up in a 
few words. We should establish with our frontier 
States of Khelat, Afghanistan, Yarkund, Nepal, and 
Burmah, intimate relations of friendship ; we should 
make them feel that, though we are all-powerful, we 
desire to support their nationality; that when necessity 
arises we might assist them with money, arms, and 
even, perhaps, in certain eventualities, with men. We 
could thus create in them outworks of our Empire; and 
assuring them that the days of annexation are pa,ssed, 
ma,ke them know that they have everything to gain  
and nothing to lose by endeavouring to deserve o u r  
favour and support. Further, we should strenuously 
oppose any attempt to neutralise &those territories in 
the European sense, or to sanction or invite the inter- 
ference of any European Power in their affairs. IIt 
may take years to develope this policy. I t  is contrary 
to what has been hitherto our course in India ; but if 
it is once established, recognised, and appreciated, o u r  
Empire mill be comparatively secure." 
These were the general views held consistently by 
Lord Mayo during his Indian administration. He had 
no wish in 1869 to send British Agents to Afghanistan, 
I 
J knowing that to do so at that moment was to  cour t  
risk for no corresponding benefit. They could t hen  
only have gone to interfere with domestic politics, o r  
to support the b e e r ' s  dynasty. Afghanistan was  
not threatened from without. Although Russia h a d  
made rapid conquests in Central Asia, she had n o t  
approached inconveniently near t o  the Afghan border ; 
and Persia showed no symptom of aggression on 
Herat. Consequently the discussions a t  Umballa 
between Lord Mayo and Rhere Ali dealt rather 
with Afghanistan recovering from domestic brawls, 
than with afghanistan fearing the aggressions of 
a foreign power. This state of things gave a very 
distinct colour to the Umballa proceedings, and made 
all that mas then said and done essentially different 
from transactions of a more recent date. 
Lord Mayo was not, however, satisfied with the 
mode in which we were represented in Afghanistan, 
and he, therefore, authorised the Foreign Secretary to 
confer tentatively with Nur Mahomed on the subject. 
I give the question put, and the answer given, in the 
two conferences held on this subject on the 1st and 
3rd of April, 1869 :-1st April. " Question. Would 
the Ameer sanction Native Agents - in Afghanistan, 
either as visitors or  as permanent residents, sup- 
posing the British Government wished it ? " Reply. 
" The Minister remarked that he did not wish 
to commit himself, and asked rather anxiously 
whether European Agents were intended, observing, 
a t  the same time, that it was no use to send any but 
Mahommedans ; Hindoos were of no good at all. He 
begged that his reply might not be put  on paper. He 
said that he first distinctly wished to ascertain the 
Ameer's sentiments. . . . . He added, he was 
looking far forward, and the day might come when 
the ' RUSH ' would arrive, and the Ameer w o ~ ~ l d  be 
glad not only of British officers as Agents, but of 
arms and troops to back them." 
3trcl April. c g  Referring to the points which were 
reserved in the conversation of April lst, 1869, the 
Minister said that there was no occasion to include 
Ghazni as a place of residence for a British Agent, as 
Ghazni mas included in Cabul. The Ameer was ready 
to have a writer to accompany him wherever he moved, 
and to allow of men in Turkestan and Balkh, when 
the country mas more settled." 
" At the close of the interview the Foreign Secretary 
took the Minister apart and clearly explained to him 
His Excellency's instructions that, under no circum- 
stances, mas the Ameer to expect that British troops 
would cross the border to put down civil mar or 
domestic contention. This intimation was repeated to 
the Minister by the Foreign Secretary at a subsequent 
interview, and the Minister's reply on both occasions 
was clear and satisfactory as to the Ameer's full 
ulzderstandizg on this point." 
I n  alluding to the coilversations, Lord Mayo* 
said :- 
" Two interviews have taken place between the con- 
fidential adviser of His Highness Syud Noor Mahomed 
Shah and our Foreign Secretary. At these interviews 
various matters of importance mere fully discussed, 
and the means whereby trade with Afghanistan could 
be encouraged, and additional measures for securing 
the peace of the frontier could be promoted, were 
carefully considered. An opportunity was also taken, 
at the same time, to inform the Minister, in the 
* Government of India to Secretary of State, 3 April 1869, 
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clearest and most explicit terms, that the British 
Government would always abstain filom any direct 
interference in the internal aBairs of ~fghanistan, and 
t h a t  under no circumstances could BGtish troops or 
Bri t i sh  oficela be employed across the frontier in 
quelling civil contentions or domes tic strife. " 
Lord Mayo's object at Umballa was to keep his 
Government f ree  from engagements and pledges of 
a n y  kind except those contained in the letter addressed 
t o  Shere Ali, dated 31st March 1869,* which intimated 
t o  him that whilst the Briiish Government did not 
desire to interfere in the " internal affairs of Afghan- 
istan," yet that it would "view with severe displeasure" 
any attempts on the part of his rivals to disturb his 
position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war; 
and that it would further endeavour, from time to 
time, " by such means as circumstances may require," 
t o  strengthen the Government of His Highness. 
Finding, however, that the Home Government 
did not view these pledges with favour, he justified 
them in some detail in a subsequent despatch,? de- 
scribing his general policy a t  Umballa in the following 
words :- 
" The policy that  we had endeavoured to establish 
may be termed an intermediate one ; that is to say, that  
while we distilictly intimated to the Ameer that, under 
no circumsta~~ces, hould a British soldier ever cross 
his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebelLious 
subjects; that no European officers would be placed 
* See p. 90, Afghanistan, No. 1. 
t Government of India, 1 July 1869, p. 94, Afghanistan, No. 1. 
as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or 
money allowance would be given for any named period; 
that no promise of assistance in other ways would be 
made ; that no treaty would be entered into, obliging 
us under every circumstance to recognise him and his 
descendants rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were 
prepared by the most open and absolute present 
recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly 
disposition, of respect for his character and interest in 
his fortunes, to give him all the moral support in our 
power, and that in addition we were willing to assist 
him with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers, 
and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or 
desirable to do so." 
I admit that the phrase in this letter touching the 
" European officers" may be construed to bear, to 
some extent, the interpretation placed upon it by the 
Duke of h g y l l ,  in the light of Lord Mayo's private 
letter of the 3rd of June 1869. 
But I affirm with confidence, on the evidence of 
Lord Mayo's other letters and the official records of 
1869, that no pledge of the nature suggested was 
given to the Ameer at Umballa. It was Shere Ali 
who, on first arrival at Umballal, expressed his 
' c  willingness " to receive British Agents at his out- 
posts, and his absolute " wish" to receive them if 
Russia ever approached nearer to him. I t  was Lord 
Mayo who knew that such a measure, if adopted 
by him, would draw from the Ameer further pres- 
sure for a treaty on the lines of the agreement of 
1857, and commit him to support the Ameer's dynasty. 
ca; 
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The subjeot came, therefore, into the category of what 
the Ameer was not to have. 
I much regret, by any testimony of my own, to 
cast a shadow of doubt on any expressions used by 
Lord Mayo in his private letters. But these expres- 
sions must be read, as I said before, in the light of 
the official records of 1869, and of the spirit of that 
great and good Viceroy's whole policy. I feel sure 
that no one more than Lord Mayo himself, were he 
now alive, would regret the meaning attached to 
words which he intended merely to apply t o  the 
fact that he had no desire to force a "Resident 
at Cabul" on the Ameer, or to send officers across 
the frontier to countenance Shere Ali's family quar- 
rels, and commit the British Government to support 
his dynasty in the state of thngs existing at that 
p er io d. 
Is it ~ossible  that Lord Mayo, whose sole object at 
Umballa was to establish an intermediate policy capable 
of future development, and to keep his hands free in 
regard to future contingencies, would tie to all time 
his own action, and the action of his successors, by 
a pledge in the sense understood by the Duke of 
Axgyll? Could he have done so without specifio 
instructions from the Home Government? Had so 
solemn a pledge been given, would it not have been as 
solemnly placed on official record 2 Would it not have 
been given personally by the Viceroy to Shere Ali? 
Would not Shere Ali have mentioned it in subsequent 
- transactions ? Would not Nur Mahomed have brought 
it forward as an unanswerable argument to Lord North- 
brook in 1873,* when his Foreign Secretary pressed on 
that wily Asiatic the advantages of a permanent British 
representative at Cabul ? Would he not equally have 
given to such a pledge a prominent place in his argu- 
ments at the Peshawur Conference of 1877, and have 
thereby effectually stopped all further discussion ? 
Nur Mahomed certainly did constantly refer, both 
in 1873 and 1877, to Lord Mayo's pledges to the 
Ameer, but only in the sense that those pledges meant 
an unconditional guarantee of protection without 
return of any kind from Shere Ali-an argument 
successfully disproved both by Lord Northbrook and 
Lord Lytton. 
I t  stands to reason that if the b e e r  was not un- 
willing in 1869 to receive British Agents into his 
country (except at Cabul), he would hardly have 
devoted all his energies to obtain a concession, a 
solemn pledge, to the contrary from Lord Mayo. 
If the evidence, in regard to this willingness, of the 
Viceroy's confidential interpreter, Major Grey; of the 
* See Government of hd ia  lett.er, para. 13, 10 May 1877, p. 162, 
Af ghanistan, No. 1. It is remarkable that in none of the arguments 
used by Nur Mahomed at any time was mention made of any pledge 
given to the b e e r  by Lord Mayo on the subject of Agents. It is 
equally remarkable, as showing the slow rate of progression of 
the Afghan nation, that Nur Mahomed repeated the same excuses 
for delay, in regard to the question of British Agents in Afghan- 
. 
istan, as urged twenty years previously by Hafiz-ji. No wonder 
the b e e r  exclaimed at Peshawur, L L  All people are advancing in 
the arts of peace and civilization. It is only we dfghans who 
remain the ignorant asses we have always been." (Commissioner 
of Peshawur's Report, 12th March 1869). 
( 29 ) 
Ameer's friend and confidential i n t e r~ re t e~ ,  Dr. Bellew; 
of the Viceroy's Private Secretary; and of Lord Mayo 
himself; are collectively to be treated as inaccurate 
and valueless, then I have nothing more to say. But 
I venture to think that no after attempts to shake 
our evidence, or to throw doubts on records accepted 
afid oficially recorded in 1869, should be allowed 
to weigh with any reasonable mind as against facts 
established in that year, accepted by the Covern- 
ment of that day as genuine, and not doubted or 
attempted to be shaken until many years afterwards. 
If, on the other hand, our evidence is trustworthy, 
then the argument now put forward that British 
officers in Afghanistan were in 1869 the one dread 
and abhorrence of Shere Ali. falls to the ground. 
I It is of course possible that Lord Mayo, when he 
! 
I instructed Mr. Seton Karr to let the subject of a Resi- 
I dent at Calsul "drop," may have given him some 
1 general authority to assure Nur Mahomed that he had 
no wish to send an officer to Cabul against the Ameer's 
wish. Admitting this, for the sake of argument, let 
us examine for a few moments how the fact affects 
the policy adopted since 1875-76, by Her Majesty's 
present Government and the Viceroy. 
The instructionst sent by Lord Salisbury to the 
Governor-General of India on the 22nd January 1875, 
made the establishment of a British Agency at Herat 
(not a t  Cabul) dependent on the " assent of the 
* '( The Eastern Question," Vol. ii. p. 271. 
afghanistan, No. I., p. 128. 
Ameer," His illstructions of the 19th November 
1875 pointed equally to the necessity of obtaining 
the ccconcurrence" of the Ameer even in receiving 
a temporary mission in his capital to confer on Ceiitral 
Asian affairs. The instructions of the 28th February 
1876, given to Lord Lytton, pointed equally to 
a temporary mission to Cabul "to overcome the 
Ameer's apparent reluctance," as reported by Lord 
Northbrook, to the establishment of Agencies in 
Afghanistan ; and to the offer of great and permanent 
benefits, the only return for which benefits was to be 
His Highness's consent to the placing of British 
Agents in those parts of his dominions whence they 
might best match the " course of events " outside his 
dominions. There is certainly no sign in these papers 
of any attempt to break solemn pledges, even had 
they been given, or any desire to force Agents on 
Shere M i  " against his wish." 
From my position as Private Secretary to Lord 
Lytton, I am able to say from personal experience that 
nothing could exceed, from the first moment he landed 
in India, the patience with which that nobleman dealt 
with Shere Ali, and the pains he took in carrying out 
the instructions of the Home Government. 
/ On arrival at Calcutta he arranged, with the 
' unanimous concui-rence of his Council, to send 
his own aide-de-camp, Ressaldar Khanan Khan, to 
the Ameer, charged with a letter and verbal mes- 
sages to Shere Ali, informing him of his intention 
to  depute Sir Levis Pelly temporarily to Cabul, or 
to any other place convenient to His Highness, 
to confer 
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of the moment, for wording his communication in 
this language, -urging the Ameer to reconsider his 
position and the chances he was throwing awa i  of a 
firm alliance with the British Government. ' That  
communicat,ion went to the Ameer, after careful and 
lengthened at Simla, on the 8th of July 
After a delay of nearly two months, the Ameer 
replied, still refusing to receive Sir Lewis Felly, b u t  
pyoposing that the British Vakeel a t  Cabul should b e  
summoned to Simla to expound, the whole state of 
affairs, and to hear what the Byitish Government had 
to say to the Ameer. So reluctant was Lord Lytton 
to treat the Ameer harshly or hastily, that he p u t  
aside all his own wishes on the subject, and con- 
sented to this course. By the hand of this Vakeel 
he entrusted, for communication to Shere Ali, an 
Aide Memoire, dated 13th Oct. 1876. jf 
This Aide Men~oil*e informed Shere Mi, clearly and 
succinctly, of the great and liberal coiicessions t h e  
British Government was prepared to grant him, and 
of the reasonable return required by it  for tliose 
concessions. 
.' 111 offering the Ameer these terms, viz. a treaty of 
alliance, a dynastic and territorial guarantee, a n d  
prospective financial and military aid, Lord Lytt80u 
distinctly indicated, in conciliatory language, that he 
had no desire to press Agents on the Ameer against 
his wish. ' But it was clearly impossible to undertake 
the weighty obligations, above noted, on behalf of the 
b e e r  unless His Highness, on his part, consented to 
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accept the conditions offered to him; and this was all 
that yas  intimated to Shere Ali. He was asked to 
discuss the matter frankly, and he knew perfectly well 
that the discussion would be a fair and reasonable one 
on the part of the Indian authorities. 
I n  this Aide Memoi~e Lord Lytton said, in effect, 
"I am prepared to give you a treaty, guarantee your 
dynasty, a large annual subsidy, and defence from 
outward aggression, some of which benefits you desired 
in 1869, some in 1873 ; if you desire them now, all I 
ask in return is permission to establish a British 
Agent at Herat or elsewhere on your frontier to watch 
affairs beyond it. These officers are not to inter- 
fere with you. If they do, I will at once recall them." 
In short, to be accurate, I give his own words.* He 
said :- 
A I authorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that I am 
glad to find it in my power to relieve his mind from 
many apprehensions as to my intentions, which appear 
to have been caused by circumstances previous to 
my assumption of the Government of India. I 
autliorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that, if His 
Highness wishes to make me his friend, I mill be a 
warm and true, a fast and firm, friend to him, doing 
all that is practically in my power to stand by him 
in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to 
strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to 
confirm the succession in the person of his son Sirdar 
Ab dullah  an," 'etc. 
'" I am, therefore, willing to give him rt treaty of 
friendship and alliance, and also to afford him assistance 
I 
. v-' . 
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m anns, men, and money, for the defence of his terri- 
tory against unprovoked foreign invasion. I am - 
f urtller willing to give him immediate pecuniary 
assistance, and to give to his son, Abdullah Jan, the 
public recognition and support of the British Govern- 
ment*. 
c c  But I cannot do any one of these things unless 
tlie Ameer is, on his part, equally willing to afford me 
the practical means of assisting His Highness in the 
protection of his frontier, by the residelice of a British 
Agent st Herat, and at such other parts of that &ontier, 
most exposed to danger from without, as may be 
hereafter agreed upon. 
" I do not even wish to embarrass the Ameer, whose 
present difficulties I fully sympathise with, by carrying . 
out this arrangement until after the signature of a 
Treaty of Alliance between us, on terms which ought 
to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our 
friendship ; nor unt.il after the Ameer shall have had 
tlie means of making known to his people that the 
presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan signifies 
tliat, lie is there without interfering in internal Stat'e 
matters, as  the firm supporter of the Arneer and of 
the heir-apparent, to aid them with all the influence 
and power of the British Government in defending 
their country against foreign aggression, and to  dis- 
courage  attempt,^ on the part of the disaffected to  
disturb its internal tranquillity or weaken the throne 
of His Highness. 
" It will be the duty of any such British Agents to  
watch the external affairs of the frontier, furnishing 
timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the 
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Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should 
the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain 
that any British Agent has interfered in the internal 
affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be 
re-called. 
c G  I have no wish to  disturb the existing Native 
Agency at Cabul, or to urge upon the Ameer the 
reception of a permanent British Envoy at his Court, 
if His Highness thinks that the presence of such an 
Envoy would be a source of embarrassment to him. 
But, in that case, I should, of course, expect that n o  
obstacle be placed in the way of confidential commu- 
nications between myself and His Highlieless, by means 
of special Envoys, whenever the interests of the two 
Governments may require them. 
"In short, it is my object and desire that the treaty 
of friendship and alliance, as well as the presence of 
British Agents on the Afghan frontier, should be a 
great strength and support to the Ameer, both at 
home as well as abroad, and not a source of weakness 
or embarrassment to him." . 
In his personal conference with the British Vakeel 
(who was individually opposed to  anything like his 
own supersession in Afghanistan by temporary or per- 
manent European Agents, and was not therefore a very 
cordial co-operator) Lord Lytton used firm language. 
It was necessary to show this official that whilst the 
British Government did not desire to b'e unfriendly to 
Shere Ali, it was not a Government to be trifled with. 
The Ameer, d t e r  all, was only asked to consider the 
proposals laid before him; they were not being forced 
upon him against his will. The Vakeel expressed, 
( 36 1 
or at any rate pretended to express, his hope that  
Shere Ali would consent to consider the p'oposals so  
beneficial to his interests. But the hostile feeling at 
cabul against the British Government remained un- 
changed. On the return of the Vakeel, the Ameer, 
under pretence of sickness, declined to receive h im  
for some weeks ; and when at  last he did so it was - 
I11 fact, there was  f 
treachery at work, and a a further delay of t h r ee  j, 
'i 
; during which the Viceroy vainly waited for a 
reply to, or even a recognition of, his friendly Aide 
At  length, on the 28th January, 1877, the Pr ime  
Afinister, apparently as a reply to the Aide Memoil*e, 
appeared a t  Peshawclr. The Viceroy accepted the 
deputation of this functionary as a token of Shere Ali 's 
acquiescence in the discussion of the important mat ters  
impending between them, on the bases of that doou- 
ment. But he was deceived. Nur Mahomed was ted  
meetings which lasted from the 30th of January to 
the 19th February, 1877, in mere recriminations as 
to past policy. He professed to have no authority to 
discuss the bases of the Aide Memoire ; and all this time 
Shere Ali continued his activity at Cabul in jehad! 
matters ; and now openly, as he had hitherto d o n e  
secretly, issued to the whole of the tribes down the 
frontier, sunnuds obtained from the Akhoond of Swa t ,  
authorising a religious war against the British Govern- 
ment, a war which might have broken out at  a n y  
moment. Shere Ali was in nightly conference with 
Russian Agents ( affairs in Europe were critical, md 
Lord Lytton was only too glad to take advantage of 
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the death of Nur Mahomed to avoid further pitfalls. 
He now found it impossible to pledge the British 
Government to a treaty with a ruler who so clearly 
showed the cloven hoof, and he put an end, on justi- 
fiable grounds, to a conference which co~lld in these 
circumstances only end in mischief. Lord Lytton took 
this step not only with the full concurrence of his 
confidential advisers, but with the approval of the 
Home Government. 
Such is the history of the commencement and 
termination of the Peshawur conference. Whilst the 
Indian Viceroy was endeavouring to maintain satis- 
factory relations with the Ameer by offering hun aU 
he was ever supposed to desire, in return for a con- 
cession to which he had not in former years indicated 
insuperable objections, Shere AX was nourishing 
against the British Government an inveterate ani- 
I mosity , an animosity rendered specially dangerous by the past intimacy of his relations with General Kauf- 
mann. This intimacy we were powerless to prevent 
or counteract on account of our continued and accepted 
exclusio~i from kfghanistan. 
In  the then existing state of things in Europe it 
became necessary for the Government of India to 
remain passive, so long as it could do so with dignity, 
and so long as the b e e r  did not commit any further 
overt act of hostility. 
But all further efforts to strengthen our relations 
with him, and to place them on a proper footing, were 
useless ; and close intercourse between the two Go- 
vernments practically ceased. Events had, in fact, 
proved the correctness of Lord Mayo's view of Shere 
Ai,  as expressed in 1869 : "He is a wilful, impulsive 
man, leaving much to fate, and possessing few of 
the generous qualities which characterised his father. 
We cannot do much but watch him as well as we 
can." 
I confine my observations to facts in regard to  
which I have personal knowledge and recollection. 
I do not, therefore, attempt to touch on those later 
passages in our relations with Cabul which followed 
the b e e r ' s  reception, in July last, of a Russian 
mission. I -do not write in any controversial spirit, 
nor do I desire to do more than fulfil a duty to Lord 
Mayo, to Major Grey, and to myself, in establishing 
plain facts, and in removing doubts as to the accuracy 
of our evidence. 
I commend the plain facts set forth in this narrative 
to the impartial consideration of fair-minded men, 
before they accept as conclusive the Duke of Argyll's 
estimate of the evidence, on particular points, of 
witnesses opposed to his own view of the case; and 
his criticisms on the action of the present Viceroy of 
India and the Government which Lord Ly-tton has 
faithfully served. 
OWEN TUDOR BURNE. 
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No~~.-Since writing the foregoing observations, 
I have read a letter from Major Grey in the Times of 
this day's date. As this letter strengthens my o m  
evidence bearing on the Umballa conferences, I append 
an extract from it :- 
" I was confidentially employed by Lord Mayo on the occasion of 
the meeting with Ameer Shere Ali W a n  at  Umballa. I kept full 
mmnoranda of everything that occurred, and these, with copies of 
official reports, semi-official notes, and other papers that passed 
through my hands, are now %efore me. 
" Mr. Seton Karr should be cognizant of what passed betweell 
myself and the Ameer, or his Wazir, on various occasions during 
the Umballa meeting, for I embodied the results of my interviews 
in official reports, dated the 29th of March, the 3rd of April, and 
the 4th of April, 1869. In the last of these, which was a summary 
of my entire proceedings, I gave an abstract of the results of piivate 
interviews with,the b e e r ,  or Wazir, on the 26th of March (before 
the Viceroy's arrival); the 27th, 29th, 30th, and the 31st of March, 
the 1st of April (three interviews), the 2nd of April (several 
interviews), and the 3rd of April. In  the first of them is the 
following passage :- 
L C  He (the Ameer) is open to any proposition for securing his 
northern border ; while doubtful of any Russian power for aggres- 
sion for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be 
taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superin- 
tendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would 
gladly see an agent or engineer superintendent there (in Balkh), 
Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the 
supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger to 
such did they respect the Afghans and themselves.' 
a My summary of the 4th of April, 1869, before referred to, states 
that the Ameer was a party to this conversation, which occurred 
previous to the first private interview of the b e e r  with the Vice- 
roy on the 29th of March. I obtained the Ameer's opinions on this 
point with a view to f e matter being broached at that interview, which, 
however, for some reason, was not done. The second private interview 
between the Viceroy and Ameer occurred on the 3rd of April. My 
official summary of the 4th of April, says :- 
66 6 Ofi *day, the 2nd of April, I had several interviews with 
the beer and Wazir regarding points to be settled by the latter 
with the Foreign Secretmy next morning (the discussionregarding 
trade routes) and hp the Ameer at  the next day's private 
interview. ' 
c c  3lY pl+,rivate memoranda say on this head :- 
c c  In accordance with my representations, therefore, a new letter 
was addressed to the Ameer, to which I was directed, if possible, 
to obtain a reply of complete satisfaction, and also to arrive at a 
&finite understanding with him on various other points noted 
below, which should be held the second private interview, 
which shoulcl in a manner sanction and confirm the results of the 
The points were : (1) That the b e e r  should accede 
to our deputation of native Agents whereveer me pleased-to this 
the b e e r  agreed and promised to assist them in every may ; (2) 
to whether the Ameer mas agreeable to the deputation of 
, ~ n v o y  at some future date-on this point the Ameer expressed 
his willingness to receive an Envoy as soon as things had somewhat 
down, anywhere save at Cabul, where he thought i t  would 
affect his power with the people. . . .' 
ctIn March, 1875, the Government of India inquired from me 
rnhcther my knowledge of what passed at Umballa led me to 
believe that the Ameer would received British officers a t  Herat o r  
Candahar. I replied, giving the facts detailed above, and 
I may note that the b e e r  was at the time eager to meet our  
views, or what he supposed to be such, and his whole attitude was 
that of one anxious to please.' I further explained myself, semi- 
officially, as follows :- 
lC  ' I n  saying that he would receive an Envoy when matters had 
soniewhat settled down, the Ameer referred, as I understood, 
merely to hi9 immediate t~ouhles, Afghanistan being then still 
much disturbed and a campaign in Turkestan imminent. I had 
been instructed to ask whether the Ameer would receive an Envoy 
" a t  some future date."' He had agreed to the deputation of native 
Agents " wherever we pleased," and his only stipulation regarding 
British Envoys was that they should not reside in cabu1.j B 
" Your obedient servant, 
" H. GREY, Major, Political Agent and Superb- 
" tendent, Bahawalpur State. 
" Bahawalpur, Jan. 18." 
0. T. B. 
24th Feb. 18'79. 
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Reprinted from " COLBURNyS UNITED SERVICE HAGAZINE." 
OUR SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
I Purpose confining my remarks upon the important subject of 
the proposed rectification of our  frontier line exclusively t o  t h e  
present military and political aspects of the question as, eq~lal ly 
with Sir H. Norman, I should deprecate any reference t o  the 
policy which has preceded t he  present war in Afghanistan, for I 
cannot but  consider that  the  recent Parliamentary discussions have 
been based upon a n  entirely false issue, and that the  question 
which the Nation really required to be solved, was not whether 
Lords Lawrence and Northbrooke in acting upon the traditional 
motto of the British Foreign Office, viz., "Sufficient for the day i s  
the evil thereof," failed to talne the  necessary steps to establish our 
influence a t  Cabul, and,,hus to frustrate the  aation of Russia, action 
wLich, although fully anticipated by all who had carefully studied 
the political strategy of t ha t  great Power, both in Europe a r~d  
Asia, may have been looked upon by the  noble Lords and their 
advisers as still probably very remote, but  whether, when we found 
tlint comtnunications were frequently passing between General 
Kauffmann and Sher Ali and that, finally, a Russian Mission . 
had reacl~ed the capital and Russian influence become all-powerful 
at the Arneey's Court, it was our duty, in the interests of our 
Indian Empire and  for the maintenance of peace both within and 
without our borders, to supinely continue to pursue our policy of 
masterly inactivity, or to a t  once encleavonr to counteract tbe  in- 
trigues, I will not say of our enemy, but  certainly of our political 
rival, and to convince both her and the Ameer that, ml~ilst most 
anxious t o  maintain friendly relations with Afghanistan ancl most 
unwilling to interfere in her internal affairs, we will brook no such 
interference on the  part of a Power that has already declared the 
Ameer's territories to be beyond the sphere of her political action, 
and which consequently can only have entered the Afghan King- 
don1 with the  view of making i t  either a, screen behind which she 
might stealtllily mature her plans for clisquieting our frontier and 
spreading sedition amongst our subjects, or a cat's-paw by which 
she might effect her  ends without running the risk of being called 
to account in the event of her machinations proving unsuccessful. 
I11 mere military point of view, no one can dispute the accuracy 
of the definition given by Sir Henry Norman of a scientific frontier, 
but i t  has to be considered : 
1. Whether our present frontier answers to the definition. 
2. Whether political considerations may not over-balance the 
purely military in deciding what is to be the  future frontier of our 
Indian Empire. 
General Norman rightly states that  a good frontier is one t ha t  
a would dot entail the  employment for its defence of an excessive 
force of troops, the occupation of which would not in other re- 
spects be very costly ; the communications of which, along the 
whole line, and with  the  bases in rear, are fairly easy and not liable 
to interruptiou ; that it should, while in itself a strong bulwark, 
have in its front obst'acles that would be very serious to a n  attack- 
ing force, and yet not such as to preclude blows being delivered to 
the front by the defenders." 3 I 
Let us examine how far our present frontier accords with this 
description. I t  consists of a narrow tract of country about 500 
miles in length, situated between a range of hills on the one side, 
and a broad and rapid river on the other, hence the  force by which 
it is occupied can neither advance nor retreat ; i n  fact, not only 
does it not hold the glacis of the  fortress, but  it does not even 
I 
1 
occupy the bastions and ravelins ; so long as it is needed only for 1 
the defence of our territories against the attacks of mere predatory 
tribes occup_ving the hills, at the base of which the frontier line 
runs, possibly its great defect is of trifling importance, for the 
duty of our troops is confined almost entirely to  the  pursuit of 
raiders, who rarely wait to be attacked, but, as soon as they meet 
with serious opposit-ion, hurriedly retire, in the  hopes of escaping 
to theit- fastnesses with the booty they have captured-the desire 1 
for plunder being the sole inducement for their incursions; but 1 
\voulil this be the case in the event of India being seriously 
n~ennced with invasion by a large and well-disciplined force, aug- 
mented by a horde of irregular troops, iustigated by the hopes of 
participating in the spoils of the rich cities in the plains, to  become 
auxiliaries in the attempt. 1 
As all the passes tjo our front woulcl be closed against us, whilst 1 
our whole line would be threatened, i t  would be out of our power I 
either to advance, in order to strike a counter-blow, and act upon 
the enemy's lines of communication, or to  concentrate our troops 
upoil any given pojut, in order to meet him on his debouching 
into the plains, at %he same time with his base extending from f 
I 
I 
i 
Candahar tc  Cabnl, and sheltered from observatioi~ behind the  
screen of mouutai n s, the invader might quiet,ly collect his 
supplies and make his preparations for attacking us upon what 
might appear our [nost unguarded point, his real attack being 
accompanied aud concealed by feiuts directed upon other parts of 
our line, as the weak columns employed for this purpose when L 
driven back, woultl simply retire upon strong positions in t h e  
hills, from which me should have difficulty in dislodging them, a n d  
from which they could always again advance, thus  necessitating 
our retaining corps of observation in front of each of the three  
great passes-corps so far digttant from one another, as to prevent 
their affording mutual support in case of attack, whilst, if one  
should be overpowered, the safety of the other two would become 
jeopardised, and they could only escape from their critical posi- 
tion by retiring across the Indus in the face OF a pursuing 
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Under the above circumstances, so long as we do not colnmand 
the passes, it can hardly, I think, be maintained that our position 
is such as to enable us to deliver couuter-attacks in case of war, 
or calculated to secure our subjects from invasions from Afghans 
or others, whether incited to aunoy us by Russia, or doing so of 
their own mere motion. 
If, on the contrary, the passes were in our possession, then, in- 
deed, our positioll would be coroparatively strong. A few well- 
selected ~ositiolls, care full^ strengthened, would enable a snlall 
force to Imr tile passage of ao  army, whilst reinforce~nents could, 
when necessary, be furnished by the supporting columns l~cated in 
the plains, and even although the out-posts might be eventually 
compelled to retreat, time would be gained and, at  the same time, 
the hostile leader vould be cornl~elled, in sonie measure, to shew 
his hand, and thus from the nature of the several attaclrs, our cow 
lllander would be able to Corm so~ne idea as to the strength of thc 
enemy and his prol-pilble plan of operations, and be alJe to judge of 
the direction in which his iliain body is moving and, consequently, 
of the point on wl~icll his decisive blow is ii~teilded to be struck. 
I t  may be said that, by throwing our outposts too much in ad- 
vance, they would be isolated from their supports, and their corn- 
munications likely to be cut off, whilst, if constraiued to retire, they 
would have to do so through a difficult country, iu  which they 
would be liable to be harassed by hostile tribes. Now this obser- 
vation would apply almost exclusively to the force stationed at the 
further extremity of ,the Kh:-ber Pass ; of course, I presume that 
some years must, in all probability, elapse ere any foreign power 
could be in a position to place in line a sufficiently large army as to 
absolutely imperil our north-west frontier, in the meanwhile, may 
we not fairly hope that in the Indian Army, men may arise who, 
cheered by the success that attei~ded the efforts of the gallant and 
lamented Outraln with the Bhcels, may devote their energies to 
bringing under subjection some of the Hill tribes and, by a wisc 
display of firmness, tempered with kindness, may succeed in con- 
isrolling even the most lawless, and converting those who now form 
mere bands of robbers, into gallant. and loyal defenders of our 
rule. Should this happy result be obtained, every mountain ridge 
between Dhalia and Jumrood would become an important posi- 
tion, which t,he assailants could ouly carry with great loss; but 
even supposing the hope were not re;~liued, and the tribes con- 
tinued hostile, still the retreat need not prove difficult ; doubt- 
less, the road-way bet~veen Dhaka and Ali Musjid will be much 
improved, the distance is but twenty-one miles, of which the last 
thirteeu ouly would offer serious obstacles to the rapid inovements 
of a retiring column ; but these obstacles would equally retard the 
advance of the pursuing enemy, the more especially, as the heights 
would be crowned by the slrirmishers of the force, detached from 
the supports at the latter place, to cover the retreat. The defile 
lia,rrows for the last three miles before reaching Ali Musjid, and 
this portion of the Pass vould naturally be sharply contested, 
vllilst the wlzole of the main-body stationed in the neigl~bourhood 
of Jamrood could be brought into action in order to crush the  
enemy whilst still embarrassed in the defile, and unable t o  make 
effective use of his artillery. 
I n  the Khurum Valley, the advance-post would be at the Peiwar 
Psas, and the support-s at the Khurum fort and Thull, whilst, to 
the south, the advanced post would be in the neighbourhood of 
Quettah, or in the Fishin Valley, and the supports a t  Jacobabad 
~ h e i a c $ G b a z i  Xhan ; in neither case, apparently, would there 
be any difficulty in maintaining the requisite communications. I n  
tlle first, the out-post mould be connected with the fort by a 
valley, offering no impediments t o  a rapid advance ; and, in the 
second, although the country through which the supports would 
have to pass is rugged, and the distances are great, the popula- 
tion is friendly. 
At present, even in time of peace, in addition to the  troops 
stationed in the Cis Indus districts of the  Punjaub, a large gar- 
rison is needed a t  Pesbawur, and a special corps, consistiilg of 
(including the guides) six cavalry and twelve infantry regiments, 
with sevel-a1 batteries of artillery, is posted along the frontier, 
simply for the purpose of protecting our subjects from incursions 
from across the border, and, so long as our relatious with the 
Hill tribes remain on their present footing, no reduction can be 
made in the strength of this force. 
General Norman acknowledges that the oc~upation of the 7111~- 
rum Valley ~vould render our fronticr near Tllull more secure, but 
he objects to our holding Quettah and the Ehyber Pass, princi- 
pally upon the grouuds that  it wollld be necessary for this pur- 
pose to withdraw from the gar~isoa of India a force which he 
estimates at  not less than '7,000 or 8,000 men. Surely this de- 
n~and is greatly over-estimated, when il; is 1-emembered that, in 
1842, a garrison, entirely isolated, separated from our frontier not 
merely Lp a range of mountains, but by the entire breadth of the 
Punjaub, without any Europeari supports nearer than Kurnaul, a 
garrison consisting of one regime lit of Europeau infantry, one 
regi~neut of Native infantry, two squadrons of Native cavalry, a 
1)att)ery of artillery, and some Native sappers and miners, nurn- 
bering of all arms, about 1,800 men, not only held tlle position of 
Jellitlabad throughout the winter, but eventually iuflicted a GI-ush- 
ing  defeat upon their assailants, capturiug all their gulls and 
camp-equipage, and compelliug them to raise the siege; this, too, 
ats 5~ time when the whole of Afghanistan, elated by the aunihila- 
tiou of the Cabul gariison, had risen against us. 
Under present circumstances, with a British cantonnlent at 
Peshawur and British posts at Ali Musjid and Dhaka, a force of 
the salne strength would, i n  ordinary tirnes, bc sufficient to  gale- 
risoli Jellult~l~tlrl, especially as there seems to bo no reason to doubt 
a 1: 
lei 
1 a' 
s t .  
fu 
ested, 
rhood 
sh t h e  
make 
'eiwar 
Jst, t o  
ood of  
babad  
. t h e r e  
.s. 111. 
by a 
in t h e  
would 
t r oops  
:e gar- 
tin$ of 
Lments, 
:ontier, 
ursion s 
itii t h e  
can b e  
e Xhrz- 
Ire, b u t  
this de- 
;hat, i n  
tier n o t  
I of the 
maul, a 
;ry, o n e  
valry, 21 
s, n u t n -  
sition of 
a c r u s h -  
111s an& 
hie, too, 
~ u n i h i l a -  
nient a* 
. force of 
; to  g;Llf- 
t o  d o u h  t 
the possibility of ollr being ullle to r;lisc from 111tA I-lill tril~es, for 
t h e  protectoil of our line of co~iln~uuication througli tho l ihyber  
Pass, a body of militin, perfectly f i~i thf~l l  so long as tlleir pay m:iy 
be regularly issuecl, slncl capable, under tlie co~ltrol of :l cardully 
selected cornn~anrler, who would study their foeliugs and prejudices, 
of becotnii~g an extremely valushle force, and the lever tllrfiugh 
which we might extend cur influence generdly throughout, tlie 
border. With t-he Khpber Pass it1 our hands. the force in the 
Peshawur Division might, with possibly col~sitlerable advantage 
a s  regards the ht.alth of the British troops, furnish th5 necessary 
detail to  form the Jellulrtbud garrison ; the duty of holcling the Khu- 
r u m  Valley would be ent,rustecl to the Puriiaub frontier force, whilst 
t h e  addition of 21 wing of a Eu~-opeali r;gituent to tlie forcc by 
which Quettah has recently beell occupied, mould be sufficient to 
render tha t  post capable of resisting auy unforeseen attack tllnt 
might  be made upon it,. 
The Shami District, which is 5,500 feet above the sea, is state~l 
t o  have a delightful -climate, in' the hottest season of the year 
(between June  and August), the highest range of the tliernio~netcr 
being SO0, an agreeable contrast to that of Scinde, from mhicli tlle 
mring might safely be withdrawn, whilst the men would benefit by 
their removal from a district in which, during fire months in the 
year, t he  heat is excessive, often reinaining a t  100' throughout 
t h e  night. 
Under tohe dispositioli al~p.)ve sl~ecified, the estahlislimcut of t l ~ :  
three advanced posts would l.)rove no great drain upon our Arrny 
and, with the exception of the corps of Local Militia, of which t l~ u  
cost would not be excessive, need not elitail auy necessit,~ for tlic 
addition of a single soldier. 
Any scheme for occupying the ranges of hills stretching fro111 
Hazarah to Scinde and civilising the inhabitants by maill force, 
might  certainly be deemed visionary, and we lnllst trust, as Sir 
H. Norman truly states, to time and such civilizing iufluences as 
we can bring to bear  to taliie and educate these mild people ; 
b u t  i t  is  a question wliethor cccupying rhe advanced positions 
now proposed, we should not possess greater ficilities fur exert- 
i n g  our influence over .thew. This would be wore particulsrljr 
t he  case as  regirds the  tribes in the neighbourhood of the Khyher 
Pass  ancl Ehururn Valley, upon whoul tbe rery fact of our 
holding posts in their rear would have a great. moral etfect. 
The task  of spreading the blessings of order and civilization 
amongst tho fierce races to be found in the borderland is, doubt- 
less, deserving of serious consideration-it is ou e involving great 
labour responsibility, and can only be carried out gradually ; 
still i t  is not beyorld the power of Great Britain, and, if success- 
fully must add materially to  tlie s:rl'ety a ~ i d  pros- 
perity of our o\vll provinces. Hitllcrtu our efforts tntrirrds this ~ n d  
heell almost ciltircly cnlifi ned t,o isolilt,erl acts of pl l~i~l luiel l t  
,J repression, no systematic attempt has been made to  bring 
thenl under our influence, and any such attempt would have 
been utterly fruitless and, indeed, out of place, so long as they were 
beyond the  limits of our jurisdiction, and ackaowledged nominal 
to another power, but once brought within our fron- 
tier line, means would not be wanting for the extension of our 
intercourse with them, and we might fairly anticipate that, in  
the course of a few years, such intercourse, if conducted under 
wise and strict supervision, ulight lead to happy results. 
In his precis of the Art of War, General Jomini, in referring to  
lines of defence, states tha t  all chains of mountail~s and all great 
defiles, protected by entrenchments upon their accessible points, 
can be regarded as defensive lines, a t  the same time, strategic 
and tactical, since they serve to su~pend during several days the 
march of an enemy, and oftea oblige hini to  deviate from his 
direct march to seek a passage less difficult, in which case they 
prove a n  evident strategic advantage; but if the enemy aitaclis 
them in  force to their front, then it is clear that they have also a 
tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to attack an 
enemy in a post strong, both by nature and art, than to attack 
him in a n  open plain ; and he points out how the small fort of 
I 
I Bard might have arrested the descent of the Army: of Napoleon 
into the Valley of Aosta, and, equally, how a few good forts in the 
defiles of the Balkans might have frustrated the Russian plans in 
the  campaign of 1829, remarking that, to concentrate firces in 
the  plains, is a natural system, but, in a country with difficult 
gorges, it is to deliver the keys of the country into the hands of 
the enemy; whilst he describes a mountainous frontier as a defile 
difficult to pass, a temporary obstacl e which, once COII quared, presents 
an advantage rather than a danger to the army which has succeeded 
in seizing it. I n  fact, the obstacle once surmounted, and the 
war transferred to the plains, the chain of x~lountains may he 
considered as a species of base upon which an  invader can always 
retire and find an rzvailable refuge. 
all great military writers agree in condemning what is styled 
an inert or passive defence, and prefer the defence with returns 
to the offensive, styled by Jomini, the defeizsive offensive, which 
he asserts combines the advantages of the two systems. So long 
as our frontier is limited to  the base of the mouutains, instead of 
including the principal Passes, our action may be restricted to our 
own territories, as, naturally, the first act of a11 enemy would be, 
as I have already stated, t o  close the Passes against us, hence, i n  
order to enable us to t'ake the offensive, we must, in the first 
instance, carry tllem by assault, an  operation likely to be atteoded 
with great loss, and which might not, if they were scientifically 
streogthened and defeilded by a resolute enemy, prove successful, 
so that, against our mill, we might be colnpelled to act upon the 
purely defeusive; i u  the present war the oppositiou met wit11 in 
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the Passes has been comparatively feeble, but me haw no right t o  
calculate upon our obtaining possession of them on such easy term s 
in the event of a future campaign. 
Taking all these facts into  ons side ratio^ I think i t  can hardly 
be asserted, as a purely military question, that our present 
border-line offerg us a good and scientific frontier. 
With  the Passes in  our possession, the power of taking the 
initiative would rest i n  our own hands, and, supposing the enemy 
to  have fairly established himself in Afghanistan, and this would 
be the first ~ t e p  to be accomplished preparatory to an invasion of 
India, whilst our own right flank would be, in a great measure, 
secured, we could push forward a force on Candahar so as  to  
attack the extremity of his long line, 315 miles in extent, of 
which the right would rest upon that city, and vhich, with 
British posts a t  Jellalabad and the Peiwar Pass threatelling his 
left he  would possibly experience diaculty in re-inforcing, as he 
must either detach corps of observation to watch those posts and 
hold their garrisons in check, or else run the risk of having his 
communications with the capital exposed to attack. Instead, 
therefore, of having our frontier disquieted and the vhole of 
India agitated, as would certainly be the case if we awaited 
attack in our own f rovinces, we should become the assailants, and 
the contest would be transferred to the valley of the Turnuk. If 
success attended our arms it would, in all probability, prove de- 
cisive, whilst even if we were compelled to retreat, we should 
retire upon Quettnh, where re-inforcements would await us, and 
enable us to  arrest the enemy's progress. Meanwhile, peace and 
quietness would prevail throughout our own dominions and the 
muss of our subjects would be in no way affected, a matter of the 
greatest political importance. 
>The  foregoing views are, however, based upon the hypothesis 
that  a hostile Power had been permitted to occupy Afghanistan 
and become master of its resources and of its strongholds, but with 
Politicalor Consular Agents at Cabul, Candaharand Herat, and the 
Frontier Passes in our possession, there is little probability of any 
Foreign Power ever beiug permitted to take up such a position, 
for, not only ought our political influence to be paramount through- 
out the country, but by our being able to anticipate any hostile 
movement by an advance on Candahar, all hope on the part of 
Russia of carrying out to  a successful issue any design for ex- 
tellding her dominions in that direction must cease ; whilst, as 
she would feel assured that, so long as she contented herself with 
consolidating and improving the Asiatic Provinces at present under 
her rule aud refrained from auy interference, either open or secret, 
with a State which she should distinctly be informed is under our 
protection, and of which the limits should be clearly defined, so 
far from wishing to thwart her efforts we shonld view with satis- 
faction her attempt to bestow the advantages of good governmant 
upon the races now under Ler control, the jealousy which has for 
so many years past existed between the two nations might gradu- 
ally subside, and, by degrees, the relations of amity, which so 
long prevailed betveen them he restored. . 
Although, with reference to pui.ely military considerations, the 
~leighbourhood of Dhaka might, in some respect, be deemed the 
most suitable locality in  which to establish our extreme frontier 
post beyond the Khyber, yet there are political advantanges 
attendant upon our holding Jelallabad, which, upon the whole, 
would make that the more preferable statiiin. 
At Jelallabad, from our commanding pcjsition, we should enjoy 
an  opportunity, through the adoption of a firm but conciliatory 
attitude, of bringing under our influence the Ghilzais, one .of tlie 
most powerful of the Afghan tribes ; we should be able to enter 
into comnlunication with the Siah-posh Kafirs, a race which has, 
I believe, generally expressed themselves favourably inclined 
topards us; whilst, as suggested by me ten years ago, when 
poin tin= out the probable results of the policy then pursued, should 
in any treaty that may be concluded with the ruler of Afghanistan, 
a clause be introduced, under which he would receive a fixed liberal 
pqrneut iu lieu of all dues now levied upon our com- 
merce and in return for a guarantee of protection to the lives 
and property of our merchants, Jelallabad might become a 
commercial entrep6t, from which the ramifications of our trade 
might be exteuded throughout Central Asia, a measure that would 
probably be more effectual tovards conciliating the Afghan tribes 
and securing their good will than any diplomatic relations we 
might enter into with their ruler. Asiatic Princes are proverbially 
fickle, and owing to some fancied slight which he hopes to  avenge, 
or to his cupidity being excited by some tempting offer froul 
another Power, our ally of to-day may become our opponei~t o- 
morrow, but commercial intercourse once fairly established between 
two nations, the bonds by which they are united are not easily 
broken, and even a Sovereign may find himself powerless to 
engage his people in a war which they may feel to be opposed to 
their own interests. 
Even in a mere military point of view, Jelallabad has some 
advantages as an outpost, the garrison would co~nmand the whole 
of the valley, from the resources of which, until it was dislodged, 
an enemy would therefore be excluded, whilst, before he could 
besiege the town or oblige the British force to evacuate it by 
threatening its line of communication, he would be compelled, after 
crossing the Tezeen Pass, at an elevation of 8,200 feet, to traverse 
upwards of 60 miles of most inhospitable aud barren country by 
a road passing over long ranges of bleak hills, and through nar- 
row and rugged defiles. If he employed a large force for the 
purpose he mould experience considerable difficulty in carrying 
with him the requisite provisions, ammunition, 6tc., whilst if he 
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detached a small body there would be the risk of its being en- 
countered and defeated asit  debouched into the more open country, 
in the vicinity of Gundamuk. 
Although during the last two or three years of Lord Napier's 
tenure of office in India, our political relations with the Ameer 
Shere Ali had become somewhat strained, and apparently, Russian 
diplonlacy n7as gradually acquiring undue influence at Cabul, 
and taking possession of the ground which we ought to have 
occupied, yet there was still hope that  the Ameer might be in- 
duced to recognise the advantages that  would accrue both to him- 
self and to his people from a cordial alliance with the only Power 
that could effectually interfere to prevent Afghanistan from be- 
coming, in time, a Russian Province, hence no English statesman 
or soldier could then have advocated an advance of our frontier, 
or annexation of territory, that could only have been accomplished 
s t  the certain risk of alienating the ruler we were most desirous 
of retaining as our ally, but," with the appearance of the Russian 
Embassy at Cabul, and the refusal to receive the Mission under 
Sir Neville Chamberlain, the aspect of affairs couipletely changed, 
and the political question assumed an entirely new phase, it was 
clear that we must abandon all expectation of successfully pur- 
suing a coilciliatory policy towards the Ameer, and that, in the 
event of ally rupture with Russia, his capital would become the 
scene of intrigues for inciting the border tribes to make forays 
into our districts, eve11 if we should not find his regular forces 
arrayed against us. Hence, in self-defence, both for political and 
military reasons, with reference, first, to the effect that any in- 
vasion of our territories might have upon our subjects, amongst 
whom the slightest reverse on the Indus would, by clever intriguers, 
be magnified into an overwhelming disaster., Secondly, to the 
necessity for taking up a position which would admit of our 
assuming, if necessary, the offensive, axid also enable us to oppose 
every possible obstacle to the advance of an enemy, we were com- 
pelled to occupy the three main Passes, and thus circumstances 
having placed in our hands the keys of the gates through which 
invading columns must pass, in  the interests of the great de- 
pendency entrusted to our charge, and with the view of securing to 
its people a complete immunity from the evils caused by con- 
tinually recurring rumours of foreign invasion, and preserving for 
them the full enjoyment of the blessings of peace, it is to be 
hoped that we shall never restore them to any chief upon whose 
fidelity we cannot fully depend ; but for the future retain 
them in our own hands, and, :'although endeavouring to the 
utmost of our power, to cultivate friendly relations and to  pro- 
mote peaceful intercourse with our neighbours in Afghanistan, 
at the same time coilvince them that, whilst coveting no extension of 
territory and even fully prepared to afford them material aid and 
support in preservir~g their independence, we sti-e strong enough 
to hold our own and to  maktain the integrity of our Indian 
Empire against all assailants. $ '  
With the Passes under our control, and our north-west frontier 
strengthened so as to  effectually remove all alarm of any success- 
ful invasion from that quarter, by massing our troops upon im- 
portant strategetical points instead of dispersing them in small 
cantonments, a t  the same time re-organizing our Native Army, 
i t  might be possible to reduce our military expenditure without 
impairing our military power, and, after an almost unbroken era 
of forty years warfare, commencing from the appearance of a 
Russian Emissary at  the Court of Dbost Mahorned, the Indian 
Government, with impro~ed finances would be, at last, free to 
turn its undivided attenti011 to the improvement of the moral and 
material condition of the vast populations under its rule, and by 
securing their welfare and happiness, prove Great Britain deserving 
of the trust reposed in her, and of the high position she now 
occupies on the Roll of Nations. 
